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Abstract 
 
We present in this paper an adaptive security model for 
Multi-agent  systems.  A  security  meta-model  has  been 
developed in which the traditional role concept has been 
extended.  The  new  concept  incorporates  the  need  of 
both security management as used by role-based access 
control  (RBAC)  and  agent  functional  behaviour  in 
agent-oriented  Software  Engineering  (AOSE).  Our 
approach  avoids  weaknesses  of  traditional  RBAC 
approaches and provides a practically usable security 
model  for  Multi-agent  Systems  (MAS).  A  unified  role 
interaction model framework has been put forward that 
incorporates not only functional requirements but also 
security  constraints  in  MAS.  A  security  policy  rule 
scheme has been used to express security requirements 
in relation to affective roles. The major contribution of 
the  work  is  that  little  redevelopment  effort  will  be 
required  when  security  is  to  be  engineered  into  the 
overall MAS architecture, hence minimising the impact 
of  the  security  requirements  changes  to  the  MAS 
architecture.  We  illustrate  the  approach  through  its 
potential application in a clinical trial setting involving 
a  prototype  medical  decision  support  system, 
HealthAgents. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Distributed  decision  making  systems  are  becoming 
increasingly  useful  and  important  for  involving 
collaborative  partners  in  efficient  service  sharing 
amongst  them.  Security  is  a  growing  concern  in 
designing such systems that organisations can trust and 
use.  The  internet  infrastructure  through  which  a 
distributed system openly transfers data is not, of itself, a 
safe  environment.  Well-studied  data  encryption 
algorithms  and  publicly  available  libraries  based  on 
them can alleviate this problem when incorporated into 
the  system  messaging  network.  Yet  more  complex 
considerations are related with the management of the 
different  levels  of  access  rights  to  multiple  types  of 
resources by users distributed among and managed by 
multiple organisations. These organisations need to use 
resources from others and also need to prevent their own 
resources  from  unauthorised  use.  On  one  hand,  if  a 
system is over restrictive in resource access control then 
the  system  cannot  be  made  full  use  of.  On  the  other 
hand, if a system is not sufficiently restrictive then the 
organisations’  private  data  is  in  danger  of  being 
exposed. These constraints entail flexible security policy 
management  and  organisations  need  to  be  able  to 
configure  policies  themselves  to  reflect  their  actual 
(changing) needs. Some systems embed security policy 
modules within the application code. The tight coupling 
of software architecture with policies that spread all over 
the application, but which intend to change, makes such 
systems  hard  to  maintain.  An  adaptive  security  model 
that  is  configurable  and  which  is  reusable  across 
applications  would  represent  a  significant  advance.  A 
system  is  not  safe  if  a  model  is  developed  but  never 
managed afterwards. Policies handled by such a model 
need  continuous  maintenance  to  ensure  the  security 
model  remains  useful  -  security  is  a  process,  not  a 
product [2]. Bearing this in mind, this paper extends the 
role  concept,  incorporating  both  role-based  agent 
behaviour and role-based access control in a single role 
interaction  model.  The  easily  re-configurable  model 
maintains  not  only  functional  requirements  but  also 
security constraints in MAS. We apply this method to 
the clinical trials domain. 
 
2. HealthAgents Overview 
 
The  HealthAgents  project  [4],  a  Specific  Targeted 
Research or Innovation Project (STREP) plans to create 
a  multi-agent  distributed  Decision  Support  System  (d-
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tests to help determine the diagnosis and prognosis of 
brain tumours. Brain tumours are an important cause of 
morbidity  and  mortality  [3]  and  there  is  a  need  to 
improve  their  classification,  and  management.  Novel 
medical imaging techniques such as magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy (MRS) and laboratory techniques such as 
gene expression arrays promise to deliver these advances 
but suffer from a complexity of interpretation which has 
hindered  their  incorporation  into  routine  clinical 
practice. These new techniques provide an excellent test 
bed for the development of a computer aided decision 
support  system.  Furthermore  the  rarity  of  many  brain 
tumour types requires that information must be sought 
from many hospitals.  The use of a distributed system for 
data collection and management is therefore a necessity. 
Prior  to  incorporation  into  clinical  practice  new 
methods  must  be  fully  tested  within  a  clinical  trials 
setting. Such trials are subject not only to data protection 
laws  but  also  regulations  governing  clinical  trials 
including ethical approval and informed consent of the 
participants. For multinational projects, ethical approval 
is devolved to regional bodies without any coordinated 
or uniform decision making and so data gathered from 
different centres may be subject to different restrictions. 
Allowing for flexibility within the data security model is 
therefore essential.  
Clinical  trials  commonly  use  data  from  which 
personal information (e.g. name, address, date of birth) 
is  removed  but to which a unique patient identifier is 
added,  often  termed  link-anonymised  data.  Such  a 
scheme has the advantage of having a high chance of 
preserving patient anonymity whilst allowing data from 
the same patient to be added at a later date. This scheme 
also allows a specific patient’s data to be located and 
removed  from  the  project  at  any  time  they  request,  a 
condition  usually  imposed  by  ethics  committees.  Full 
patient records are kept for clinical purposes within the 
treating hospital and with the patient’s permission may 
be used to generate and periodically update the clinical 
trials data.   
Clinical trials are usually supported by a centralised 
database where the link-anonymised data is stored. This 
allows the patients to be reassured that their data will be 
afforded a high level of security and allows regulatory 
bodies ease of access to inspect the processes in place. 
For a distributed system, similarly robust arrangements 
must  be  designed  to  reassure  ethics  committees  and 
patients that the data is secure. However, achieving this 
is a significant challenge and here we discuss a potential 
model  for  achieving  this  together  with  the  necessary 
technical  requirements  and  their  proposed  solutions. 
Each  data  collecting  centre  could  have  an  associated 
link-anonymised  database  as  approved  by  their 
appropriate  ethics  committee.  Patient  identifiers  could 
then be kept along with the clinical patient record in the 
treating  hospital.  These  databases  need  be  the  only 
databases  kept  within  the  system  giving  a  truly 
distributed  data-warehouse.  The  limited  data  required 
for  analysis  could  then  be  subject  to  stringent 
anonymisation processes and sent  to a small number of 
specific sites for processing, for example the production 
of classifiers. In this way, the distributed nature of the 
system could be preserved whilst allowing appropriate 
regulatory access to data repositories. Security systems 
will need to be in place which can allow each centre to 
potentially  limit  the  type  of  data  transmitted  and  the 
locations it is transmitted to. 
 
3. Existing Approaches and Related Work 
 
Access control is central to the security of software 
systems, including authentication, authorisation, audit, as 
well  as  measures  such  as  digital  signatures  and 
encryption. Authentication determines who can log on to 
a system and use it, authorization determines what a user 
can do, and audit/accountability identifies what a user 
did. Two earlier access control models are discretionary 
access  control  (DAC)  and  mandatory  access  control 
(MAC).  DAC  is  an  access  policy  determined  by  the 
owner of an object. MAC is an access policy determined 
by  the  system,  not  the  owner.  An  access  control  list 
(ACL), a list of permissions attached to an object, can be 
used by both models and applied in operating systems 
such as Windows.  
A newer access control model that supports efficient 
management  is  the  widely  accepted  US  National 
Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  model  of  role-
based  access  control  (RBAC)  [1].  In  RBAC  as 
illustrated in Figure 1, roles represent job functions in an 
organisation. They bring together users and permissions. 
Permissions that describe operations upon resources are 
associated with roles. Users are assigned to roles to gain 
permissions  that  allow  them  to  perform  particular  job 
functions. For example, a clinician role can be created in 
a hospital and permission giving access to patient data 
can be associated with this role. When a new clinician 
joins the hospital, he/she can be assigned the clinician 
role and so have the permission to access patient data. A 
major  benefit  of  using  this  type  of  model  is  that  the 
reconfiguration of user-role, role-permission, and role-
role relationships, directed by administrators, can reflect 
changing  organisational  policies.  The  maintenance  of 
such  a  sub-system  that  is  independent  from  the  core 
application minimises the impact on the overall system 
of requirements changes with regard to security. RBAC 
is widely accepted as a best practice and implemented in 
one  form  or  another  in  systems  including  Microsoft 
Active  Directory,  SELinux,  FreeBSD,  Solaris,  and 
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Figure 1. The RBAC model 
In a hospital, different users with the same clinician 
role  may  have  different  permissions  to  particular 
resources.  For  example,  one  clinician  that  created  a 
patient case in a hospital might have more rights than 
other clinicians in the same hospital. Clinicians in one 
hospital could have more rights to data in that hospital 
than clinicians from another hospital. Since permissions 
are  not  directly  assignable  to  individual  users,  it  is 
impossible  to  use  RBAC  to  differentiate  users  with 
practically different capabilities in the system. Another 
insufficiency in the RBAC model is the lack of access 
context modelling. Access context can constrain specific 
conditions  that  must  be  met  before  the  access.  In  the 
above  example  of  clinicians  accessing  patient  data, 
access permission is different depending on the different 
context  (a  clinician  created  the  patient  case  or  not). 
Finally, no explicit concept of organisation and negative 
permission makes it inconvenient to grant permissions to 
a group of users except particular individuals from the 
group.  
The DAFMAT approach [5] is based on the RBAC 
model and applied to healthcare applications. Concepts 
of  user,  role,  subject  and  domain  are  used  and  their 
mappings  in  pairs  are  defined  to  formulate  access 
modes.  Authorisation  requests  are  validated  using  the 
access  modes.  However,  their  subjects  represent 
executable domain functions and other resource types, 
such as data resources, are not protected. Moreover, the 
presentation  of  this  model  is  only  for  human 
comprehension.  A  mechanism  of  forming  security 
policies  in  an  executable  manner  has  not  been 
considered. 
The importance of security in the healthcare domain 
has  also  been  recognised  in  [6],  particularly  for 
managing  patient  data  and  its  communication  in  a 
distributed environment. Security tags are used to mark 
information  with  regard  to  privacy  within  the  patient 
record  structure  so  that  access  is  restricted  to  trusted 
agents only. This approach is limited to secure patient 
data  access  and  has  paid  no  attention  to  the  many 
security  issues  involved  in  the  healthcare  service 
provision process. 
 
4.  An  Adaptive  Security  Model  for  Multi-
Agent Systems 
In this section we extend RBAC to avoid its weakness 
and to meet the unique characteristics of MAS.  
 
Figure 2. New security meta-model  
The fundamental access permission policies take the 
following form: 
{Subject (Id, Role, Organisation), Access Operation 
(Op), Access Context (Co), Resource (Id, Type)} 
Policy rules externalise security requirements and are 
structured in this form for later continuous management. 
The  meta-model  has  been  motivated  by  the  particular 
requirements  of  the  HealthAgents  project  but  it  is 
generic so that other domains and applications may use 
it. The five key points below explain the major features 
of the security model illustrated in Figure 2. 
1)  Interacting  with  other  agents  is  regarded  as  an 
additional type of resource (system service) to that of 
data and software (e.g. a classifier in HealthAgents).  
Generally,  a  user  agent  requests  a  system  resource 
from  a  resource  provider  agent  through  some 
intermediate agents. In the interaction process, one may 
enforce security policies just after the user agent delivers 
its request or before the resource is to be approved for 
use.  However,  we  conceive  all  intermediate  agents 
provide  services  in  one  form  or  another,  so  security 
constraints should be imposed in each agent interaction 
rather than in a single place as many other approaches 
do. Suppose an interaction is used by a house hunting 
user agent. It uses an estate agent finder agent and an 
estate  agent  to  look  for  information  of  properties that 
match  its  preferences.  An  agent-finder  service  and  a 
property  preference  matching  service  have  been 
provided  before  the  final  property  information  is 
returned. Different levels of services might be provided 
in  the  process  according  to  the  user’s  service 
subscription and credit information. The permission of 
the contact of an estate agent does not necessarily mean 
it will provide all its information. 
2) User agent and system agent are the two types of 
subjects,  the  former  needs  permissions  to  access 
resources and the latter provides services in MAS.  
System  agents  have  tightly  coupled  responsibilities 
decided by designers. Human users have loosely coupled 
permissions  decided  by  system  policies.  In  the 
HealthAgents d-DSS, a user who logs on to the system 
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Permissions are gained to agents through those directly 
associated (via the subject ID), roles they are assigned to 
(via  subject-role  relationships),  or  organisations  they 
belong to (via clinical organisation membership). Role 
definitions and user-role assignment are managed locally 
in  individual  hospitals.  An  administrative  role  can  be 
assigned to a HealthAgents project manager to manage 
users  and  roles  globally.  On  an  individual  basis,  a 
clinician may have full access rights to his/her patient 
while other clinicians may not. A clinician role hierarchy 
may also be defined (manager, principle clinician, senior 
clinician, junior clinician, apprentice, etc.) so that some 
clinicians have more access to operations (who e.g. can 
add new cases to the system) than others (who e.g. can 
only run classifier) according to their experience.  
3) RBAC is extended with permissions assignable to 
individuals as well as organisations. 
It  might  be  necessary  for  example  to  define  that 
senior clinicians can access all instances of a particular 
type of resource, the classifiers. More likely, individual 
entities of a resource type are specified to be accessible 
by  individual  subjects.  Permissions  can  be  assigned 
upon  a  set  (or  type)  of  resources  or  for  a  group  of 
subjects with exceptions. This can be configured by a 
positive permission policy for the whole collection and a 
negative permission for individual exceptions.  
4)  RBAC  is  extended  with  context  to  provide 
additional flexibility. 
Access context might include descriptive justification 
of the access operation, where/when the requested data 
goes,  the  duration  of  the  use  of  the  data,  the  pre-
condition  &  post-condition  of  the  access  operation. 
Agents play roles during their interaction (see point 5), 
context  varies  and  agents  behave  differently  while 
evaluating certain instance values populated at runtime. 
A  clinician  may  have  special  control  over  data  of  a 
patient under the pre-condition (a type of context) that 
he/she  is  the  principal  doctor  of  the  patient  and  this 
special identification must be checked against before a 
special operation is carried out. Context can also be used 
to  enable  access  normally  not  seen  through  rights 
delegation,  for  example,  when  two  hospitals  (or 
clinicians) reach some agreements. A hospital can then 
delegate  the  use  of  its  private  classifiers  to  another 
hospital or delegate the access of its patient data to some 
particular external clinicians or bodies for classification, 
given the appropriate ethical and patient permission has 
been  obtained.  Context  specification  is  also  useful  to 
allow  special  access  for  appointed  individuals,  even 
being outside the HealthAgents network and having no 
user  account  or  role  assignment.  By  supplying  a 
justification of how the required data will be used and 
the destination of the data transmission, the access may 
be  granted  if  such  information  is  approved  under 
appropriate contracts and with specified permissions. 
5)  A  uniform  role  interaction  model  integrates  the 
concept in agent paradigm and that in RBAC.  
A  role  plays  its  behaviour  duty  if  and  only  if  its 
permission constraint is satisfied. 
Role  is  an  important  concept  in  Agent-oriented 
Software  Engineering  (AOSE)  and  tightly  associated 
with agent behaviour. However, the role concept in the 
AOSE research community and that in the Role-Based 
Access Control community are completely distinct and 
no research has ever been carried out to reconcile the 
two  definitions  of  the  concept  for  security  control  in 
MAS.  In  our  security  model,  agent  behaviour  is 
specified  in  roles  which  not  only  realise  functional 
requirements  but  also  enforce  security  policy 
requirements. RBAC has no concept of duty and AOSE 
has  no  permission  constraint  for  agents.  The 
complementary nature directs straightforward integration 
of them in a role interaction model. Figure 3 shows a 
prototype interaction model for invoking a classification 
in the HealthAgents system. Table 1 provides an analysis 
of  the  security  requirements  for  this  prototype  model. 
The  application  of  the  security  model  is  discussed 
afterwards, sample security policies being used during 
the interaction. 
  Figure 3. A possible role-based interaction 
model in HealthAgents
 
Table 1. Role behaviour duties and permissive constraints in interaction model 
Interaction 
roles 
Interaction description  Security requirements analysis & Resource access mode 
This clinician must be authorised to have the access rights to the patient data 
before the data is returned. 
R1 and R2  A clinician requests patient data for classification. The case might have 
been inserted by the same clinician or a different clinician previously.  
Direct system resource access: patient data 
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rights to the required classifiers in the classifier directory. 
R3 and R4  The clinician sends questions (tumour or non-tumour, aggressive or non-
aggressive, glioblastoma or metastasis, etc.) to solve. Classifiers that can 
discriminate among tumour classes (so answer various questions) have 
been previously registered on yellow pages, including description about 
their capabilities, reputation, and data they have been trained upon. 
Intermediate service access: yellow page directory service (query) 
The clinician must be authorised to perform the classification operation upon 
the current case. The passing of patient data must respect legal and ethical 
constraints regarding patient privacy. Sometimes only part of the data of a 
particular  patient  can  be  supplied  externally  (image,  spectra,  etc.).  The 
communication parties might also maintain distinct security policies. 
R5 and R6  The  clinician  requests  a selection  of  classifiers to solve questions  by 
supplying patient data that registered classifiers can operate upon. 
Intermediate service access: petitioner broker service 
Classifiers located in one hospital that have been trained using data across 
many hospitals are not usable to all clinicians. Private classifiers are only 
usable to local clinicians. Appropriate contracts must be in place to allow 
clinicians to use external classifiers if they are not public ones. 
R6 and R7  Classifiers  will  attempt  to  classify  the  patient  data  supplied  to  them. 
Only those classifiers which have the supplied information (MR image, 
MR signal, or clinical information such as age, sex, tumour location) that 
completely meets their input requirements will be executed eventually. 
Direct system resource access: classifier 
The clinician must be authorised to access the global statistics information 
before the classification answers are ranked. 
R6 and R8  Classification  result  is  collected  from  the  multiple  classifiers.  The 
statistics information from other clinicians or previous performance is 
used to rank the answers before they are returned to the clinician.  Intermediate  service  access:  classification  result  compilation  and  ranking 
service 
The clinician must be authorised to update classifier reputation.  R8 and R9  The clinician evaluates the classification result produced by the selected 
classifiers  when  the  diagnosis  is  finished.  The  reputation  of  these 
classifiers is updated on yellow pages so that other clinicians will have 
better knowledge about how good each of these classifiers is in later use. 
Intermediate service access: yellow page directory service (updating) 
   
In  the  above  scenario,  information  of  the  operating 
clinician  is  passed  on  through  the  whole  interaction 
process to gain data and service access (different agents 
maintain  different  policies  for  clinicians).  Due  to  space 
limitations, only two sample security policies that must be 
enforced between the interaction of R1 and R2 are given 
in Figure 4.  
Normally, clinicians can be approved to have access 
control  and  diagnose  permission  to  patients  in  their 
hospitals.  This,  however,  may  not  necessarily  constrain 
the  system  from  perhaps  flexibly  assigning  an  external 
clinician  with  sufficient  expertise  and  competence  to 
diagnose  a  particular  patient  in  an  emergency  situation 
(when his/her original clinician is away) under appropriate 
contracts. Justification and duration context is used. This 
second policy allows an external clinician to play his/her 
behaviour  duty  in  R1  and  R2  &  R5  and  R6  anytime 
between the specified duration if a proper contract allows 
external classification behaviour. 
Roles that capture the function of agents during their 
interaction have been standardised in XML with a scheme 
of {event, processing, (condition, action)n, belief} by our 
Adaptive  Agent  Model  (AAM)  approach  [9][10].  The 
structure  describes,  on  receiving  event  messages  from 
other  agents,  how  actions  are  taken  under  various 
conditions after message processing and decision making. 
Agents execute annotated roles dynamically. Non-security 
policy  rules  are  evaluated  and  applied  during  agent 
interaction by using a Fact Manager Agent and a Policy 
Rule  Manager  Agent.  Externally  specified  interaction 
roles and policy rules capture functional requirements and 
keep maintained via a set of configuration tools [11]. The 
security policy rules as specified in Figure 4 will be later 
integrated with the existing AAM framework so that the 
existing  role/rule  repository  will  incorporate  those  with 
regard  to  security  policies.  Agents  in  the  system  will 
assume their role dynamically and will only perform the 
specified functions when they find, at runtime, all security 
constraints affective to their roles are met. 
 
Figure 4. Sample annotated security policy rules 
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be externally linked to the existing AAM interactive role 
structure within which a new global condition element will 
be added to the scheme. The relevant rules from the linked 
rule  set  must  be evaluated as satisfactory before agents 
can select specific actions to perform from the branches 
specified locally in (condition, action) couplets for their 
usual  interaction.  The  integration  of  the  security  model 
with the AAM leads to an adaptive and secure MAS that 
can  dynamically  interpret  its  behaviour  from  integrated 
requirements  and  design  models,  always  being  under 
proper  maintenance.  This  provides  a  practical  usable 
scheme  for  Model  Driven  Architecture  (MDA)  [12] 
within the agent paradigm. Capturing not only behaviour 
duty but also permission constraints, the role interaction 
model  is  distinct    from  other  security  modelling 
approaches  towards  MDA  such  as  SecureUML  [13], 
which  generates  an  architecture  that  is  only  related  to 
access control. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have presented an adaptive security 
model for MAS and shown its potential application to a 
clinical trial developing a prototype tumour classification 
system,  HealthAgents.  A  unified  role  interaction  model 
framework has been developed that incorporates not only 
functional requirements but also security constraints using 
the extended role concept. The weaknesses of traditional 
role-based access control approaches have been avoided 
in the model we designed. The major advantage of using 
this approach is that, although the requirements of access 
control could change from time to time, the system can be 
dynamically  adapted  with  up-to-date  policies  applied 
simply by the configuration of independent policies.  
Eventually  the  idea  would  be  to  document  all 
HealthAgents  security  policies  in  a  rule  repository  and 
develop extended policy configuration tools based on the 
model structure. Moreover, we will improve the security 
model in the following directions: adding detection and 
reaction  mechanisms  for  ongoing  security  processes; 
introducing  extra  protection  to  yellow  pages  from  un-
authorised  read  or  change  (so  no  agent  can  pretend  to 
provide  services  but  with  malicious  purposes).  We  will 
also add semantics-aware support to our security model, 
which is necessary for role-mapping and policy-mapping 
in  an  inter-operable  multi-domain  environment  [7]. 
Hospitals  may  sign  contracts  among  themselves  and 
delegate roles to external users and apply their individual 
policy  rules,  given  that  these  meet  the  required  ethical 
requirements. Roles and policies, possibly produced with 
different  schemes,  role  relationships  and  policy 
vocabularies need to share common understanding before 
integration  and  inter-operation  in  the  distributed 
environment.  Ontology  mapping  is  a  useful  technology 
which is already used in HealthAgents. Its use for solving 
semantic  difference  among  security  policies  across 
clinical domains will be further investigated in our future 
work.  We  will  examine  issues  arising  from  the  added 
semantics  exploring  whether  data  or  knowledge  of  the 
system can be inferred via knowledge-level conversation 
carried  out  among  semantics-aware  agents,  or  through 
ontology translation [8].  
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